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Kweskin: Netflix and No Chill

NETFLIX AND NO CHILL: THE CRIMINAL RAMIFICATION OF
PASSWORD SHARING
Benjamin Kweskin*
United States v. Nosal
I. INTRODUCTION
If I share my Netflix password, am I breaking the law? An act of
Congress, passed in 1984, could be the most important law on the books to
help answer that question. Ironically, most major companies that can
benefit from the law did not exist at the time of its passage, like Netflix,
Spotify, and Facebook. The early 1980s gave techies the floppy diskette, 1
the Apple Macintosh,2 and the founding of Dell.3 Today, Netflix exists
mostly in the cloud instead of in actual computers at a centralized location,
*

B.A. Political Science & Government, Washington University in St. Louis, 2015. J.D.
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2018. Associate Member, Business,
Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, 2016-2017. Special thanks to Note and Comment
Editor; Jennifer E. Bennett, and Professor; Bradley M. Desnoyer for their work on this
article. I could not have done it without you two. This article is dedicated to Kilian for
her support throughout the writing process.
1
R.I.P. Floppy Disc, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2905953.stm.
2
David Pierce, The Mac Turns 30: A Visual History (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://www.theverge.com/2014/1/24/5340320/the-mac-turns-30-a-visual-history.
3
Our History, DELL, http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/ph/our-history (last visited June
19, 2017).
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as tech companies did in the 1980s. The changing innovations in computer
technology and the usage of computers since the 80s will test the bounds
of some United States tech laws.
In July 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on U.S. v.
Nosal, a case that could open the floodgates for criminalizing passwordsharing. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit, more than any other circuit, has a
special interest in protecting internet companies from password-sharing.
The Court has jurisdiction over California, specifically Silicon Valley, the
epicenter of technology and internet innovation. The decision in Nosal
breaks new ground for internet litigation in Silicon Valley and has the
potential to protect internet companies in ways that terms of service
agreements cannot. However, in order to make the biggest gains for
internet companies, CFAA would have to be amended to exclude the word
“computer.”
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CFAA
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) may see more
action over the next decade than it has over the past three as internet
companies try to defend themselves against password sharing between
members, people who pay for the product, and guests, who obtain
217
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passwords without paying for the product. CFAA presents two issues for
future courts to address. The first issue is what does “without
authorization”4 means. The second issue, which will be more important for
future courts, is the definition of a computer.5 Courts have spent a
considerable amount of time and resources answering the first question,
but there has been little discussion on the second.
The CFAA states, “Whoever . . . knowingly and with intent to
defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds
authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended
fraud and obtains anything of value . . . shall be punished.”6 Put another
way, “[t]he CFAA imposes criminal penalties on whoever ‘knowingly and
with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value [from a
computer].’”7

4

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
Id.
6
Nosal v. U.S., 844 F.3d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
7
Id. at 1024 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)) (emphasis original).
5
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Originally, the 1984 CFAA targeted “hackers who accessed
computers to steal information or to disrupt or destroy computer
functionality.”8 The act was amended in 1986 to deter and protect against
certain high-tech crimes or against a scheme to defraud.9 The act does not
define what “without authorization” means.10 If “without authorization”
means “without consent,” then criminal liability will expand to anyone
who, in any way, exceeds the bounds of their contracted use. If “without
authorization” means “a substantial breach of pre-existing authorization,”
criminal liability will contract.
To respond to the first problem, two questions naturally arise: do
members exceed their authorized access by password sharing? Are guests
unauthorized? Both of these questions are briefly addressed in the
CFAA,11 but neither the statute nor case law has provided a clear answer.
Orin Kerr, perhaps, best summarizes unauthorized access in his 2015
article calling it “norms-driven.”12 He explained that computer laws

8

Id. at 1032 (citing LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129(9th Cir. 2009).
Id. (quoting S. REP. 99-432 at 4(1986)).
10
Id. at 1033.
11
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190 (1984).
12
Orin Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1154 (2016).
9
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should parallel trespass laws in terms of unauthorized access.13 Since the
publication of his article, U.S. v. Nosal was decided, which muddied an
attempt to clearly define unauthorized access.
Finally, LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka14 outlined the limitations
of CFAA in 2009 for the Ninth Circuit. Brekka involved a former
employee, his wife, and two consulting businesses.15 Mr. Brekka,
Defendant, emailed documents from his work email to his own personal
computer, and to his wife’s.16 After his employment terminated, Mr.
Brekka was still able to log onto the LVRC website.17 LVRC sued Mr.
Brekka for violating CFAA.18 In order to violate CFAA, Mr. Brekka must
be shown to have,
(1) accessed a protected computer, (2) without
authorization or exceeding such authorization that was
granted, (3) knowingly and with intent to defraud, and
thereby (4) furthered the intended fraud and obtained
anything of value causing (5) a loss to one or more persons
during any one-year period aggregating at least $5,000 in
value.19

13

Id. at 1146-47.
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
15
Id. at 1128.
16
Id. at 1129-30.
17
Id. at 1130.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1132.
14

220
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

5

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 9

The court first addressed what “without authorization” meant.20
They concluded that, “[n]o language in the CFAA supports LVRC's
argument that authorization to use a computer ceases when an employee
resolves to use the computer contrary to the employer's interest.” 21 In
other words, access must be unequivocally revoked in order to meet this
element. In Brekka, Plaintiff failed to show this element.22
The court next addressed the lack of evidence that Mr. Brekka, in
fact, logged into LVRC’s computer after his employment was
terminated.23 This issue need not be addressed in this paper, as lack of
evidence was not an issue discussed in Nosal.24
III. THE INSTANT DECISION
Nosal extends Brekka by defining the boundaries of CFAA with
regard to password sharing. In Nosal, the court focused heavily on
whether this access “exceeds authorization” under CFAA.25 However, the
court neglected to distinguish the legal difference between unauthorized

20

Id.
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See generally U.S. v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016).
25
Id.
21
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access to a computer and unauthorized access to a website.26 This
omission will test our legal system as future cases wrestle with the legal
limits of password sharing. Until tech companies lobby for an amendment
to the CFAA to include the cloud, it will be hard to argue that there is
unauthorized access to a computer.
IV. FACTS AND HOLDING
In Nosal, a former employee of a company accessed that
company’s computers after his termination.27 While employed, Defendant
was given a password.28 His credentials, however, were revoked after his
termination.29 The employee disregarded the revocation and accessed the
computers through the passwords he had obtained.30 Beyond the
employee’s own personal access, he also gave passwords to the
company’s computers to other non-employees.31 Those other individuals
had been competing for business against LVRC.32 The non-employees

26

Id.
Id. at 1029.
28
Id. at 1031.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
27

222
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

7

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 9

then downloaded trade secrets from the computer.33 A dispute arose over
what “without authorization” meant in the confines of CFAA.34 The Court
concluded,“‘without authorization’ is an unambiguous, non-technical term
that, given its plain and ordinary meaning, means accessing a protected
computer without permission.”35
Further, access restrictions and use restrictions are distinct. The
court reasoned that the “‘exceeds authorized access’ prong of § 1030(a)(4)
of the CFAA ‘does not extend to violations of [a company's] use
restrictions.’”36 In other words, the court distinguished between the
amount of information accessed and the amount of information obtained.
Once the information is obtained, its use is outside CFAA.37 38
To address some of the criticism from amici briefs of the
criminalization of password sharing, the court turns to password sharing.
The Court dismissed concerns about password sharing by stating, “this
appeal is not about password sharing. Nor is it about violating a company's

33

Id.
Id. at at 1033.
35
Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
36
Id. at 1029 (citing U.S. v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012)).
37
Id.
38
Id. The Court then addressed other counts relating to corporate espionage. Those issues
will not be discussed in this article.
34
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internal computer-use policies.”39 The majority criticized dissenting
opinions that “spin hypotheticals about the dire consequences of
criminalizing password sharing.”40 The majority does not further address
the issue of password sharing as it relates to the Defendant’s actions.
Instead of making password sharing the central issue, “the conduct
at issue is that of Nosal and his co-conspirators, which is covered by the
plain language of the statute.”41 But the Court defines said conduct as,
“conspiring with former [company] employees whose user accounts had
been terminated, but who nonetheless accessed . . . a proprietary database
through the back door when the front door had been firmly closed.”42
Defendant “blatantly circumvented the affirmative revocation of his
computer system access.”43 In other words, because Nosal went so far
beyond his access formerly permitted by his employer, there could be no
question of exceeding authorized access. The court does not help
determine how excessive the violation of authorization was.

39

Id.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
40
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At this point, the majority blurs the line between a “database” and
a “computer system.”44 The court does not address which moment defined
the prohibited conduct in CFAA: accessing the computer system or
accessing the database. In Nosal, both issues were created because of
password sharing.45 The difference between a computer system and a
database is significant.
When accessing a computer or a computer system, the implication
is that there is a physical computer with information stored to it. In 1984
and 1986, there was little question about what constituted a computer.
Telephones were not computers. Televisions were not computers. Videogame consoles were not computers. Today, that question is much more
confusing, as the technology in an average smartphone contains farsuperior computing power than almost any 1986 computer.46 As this

44

Id.
See generally id.
46
Compare iPhone Models, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/compare/ (last visited
June 19, 2017). Today’s iPhones have finger print sensors, 2gb of RAM, and a minimum
of 16gb of storage. Product Fact Sheet, IBM, https://www03.ibm.com/ibm/history/exhibits/pc25/pc25_fact.html (last visited June 19, 2017). The
IBM AT was largely seen as the “best” computer of the early 1980’s. Its specs included
the inferior 40K ROM (equivalent to today’s RAM), and up to 160kb of user storage per
disc. It weighed 17 pounds. Id.
45
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article will later discuss, the difference is a fact-specific one, the
liberalness of construing what a computer is will expand criminal liability.
V. COMMENT
A.

Problems with the Majority Opinion

The majority too quickly dismisses password sharing. It states that
the problem is the access, not the fact that passwords were shared.47 The
majority opinion offers no help in describing the role password sharing
played in violating CFAA. The court explains that LVRC Holdings LLC v.
Brekka48 and Nosal are substantially similar.49 Both cases involved an
individual who had gained unauthorized access to a computer.50 However,
Brekka did not address password sharing.51 Had passwords not been
shared in Nosal, there would have been no unauthorized access gained.
The majority wants to distinguish the fact that passwords were shared with
the fact that passwords were used.52
The majority’s argument on this point is purely semantic. If A
gives a key to a protected vault to person B, an unauthorized entrant, and
47

Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029.
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).
49
Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See generally id.
48

226
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

11

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 9

B gets into the vault, both A and B have committed a crime. A has
exceeded his authorized access, by sharing the key, and B has gained
unauthorized access, by using the key. The majority argues that simply
telling another person your password to an unauthorized computer does
not violate CFAA.53 But the implication behind password sharing is that
the password is shared so that it can be used. Sharing the key alone carries
no crime, but as soon as the key is used, the access is unauthorized.
The moment CFAA was violated does not change whether Nosal
has to do with password sharing. In fact, password sharing is at the heart
of the case. The majority even recounts that “password sharing was
prohibited by a confidentiality agreement that [Company] required each
new employee to sign.”54 Still, the Court concluded that Nosal is not about
password sharing.55 Thus, the breach of that agreement, or the use of
password sharing, set Nosal’s criminal liability in motion. In Nosal,
password sharing and unauthorized access are intimately connected and
dismissing them in one sentence does not help outline potential criminal

53

Id.
Id. at 1031.
55
Id. at 1029.
54
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liability in password sharing. In fact, the Court opens the door for this
issue for future cases.
B.

Problems with the Dissent

The dissent fears the criminalization of “consensual password
sharing.”56 In other words, the majority glosses over how it distinguishes
Nosal’s facts from consensual password sharing.57 The dissenting justice
notes, “[p]eople frequently share their passwords, notwithstanding the fact
that websites and employers have policies prohibiting it.” 58 He continues
by saying that the CFAA does not make the millions of people who
password share into federal criminals even though the majority may think
so.59 In the original appeal of Mr. Nosal’s conduct, Nosal I, the Court had
rejected turning the CFAA into a “sweeping Internet-policing mandate”
instead of maintaining its “focus on hacking.”60 CFAA was never meant to
police the Internet; instead, CFAA was intended to stop hackers from
taking information from computers.61 Both the Second Circuit and the

56

Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1049 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1048 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
60
Id.
61
Id.
57
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Fourth Circuit have agreed with the Nosal dissent on this point.62
Extending the CFAA to non-hacking has a major impact, which the
dissent rightly fears.63
However, the dissent has its shortfall because it misunderstands
“authorized access,” which implies non-consent. The dissent notes, “The
majority does not provide . . . a workable line which separates the
consensual password sharing in this case from the consensual password
sharing of millions of legitimate account holders, which may also be
contrary to the policies of system owners.”64 The dissent focuses on the
norms of computer and Internet use.65 This line of logic does not disprove
the majority’s point on its own. The court had the power to criminalize
Nosal’s behavior because his acts were without consent because his
credentials had been revoked.66
This point is where a company, like Netflix, should be on high
alert. Netflix’s Terms of Service are unequivocal:

62

Id. at 1048-49. (quoting U.S. v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 526–28 (2d Cir. 2015)); WEC
Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012)).
63
Id. at 1049.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1038.
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Netflix grants you (which, for purposes of this License
Agreement, shall include members of your immediate
household for whom you will be responsible hereunder and
users of the Netflix ready device with which you are
accessing the Netflix service and for whom you will be
responsible hereunder) a . . . non-transferable license.67
Netflix users who share their password, the dissent would argue,
engage in a harmless and ubiquitous act.68 This harmless and ubiquitous
act should not be criminalized simply because millions of people engage
in this behavior. The dissenting justice calls this “consensual password
sharing.”69 Instead of calling it consensual, I will refer to this password
sharing as normal password sharing because consensual cannot be
unauthorized by definition. However, normal password sharing could be
unauthorized explicitly by contract.
According to the dissent, normal password sharing is not
criminalized under the CFAA because society expects it.70 In this respect,
technology law can be similarly viewed with property law. As is the case
with implied easements, after a certain amount of time, a normal trespass

67

Nᴇᴛʟɪx Eɴᴅ Usᴇʀ Aɢʀᴇᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ, https://help.netflix.com/legal/eula?locale=en (last visited
Apr. 11, 2017).
68
Nosal v. U.S. 844 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2016).
69
Id. at 1049.
70
Id.
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can, and should, become legal.71 When there is enough password-sharing
that a company should be aware of the activity, but does nothing, there
should be a pseudo-implied easement.72 The problem is that none of the
facts in Nosal suggest that Nosal’s access to the computers at his former
company was consented to either explicitly or impliedly.
Ultimately, although the dissent is rooted in better logic than the
majority, and will eventually be on the right side of history as a matter of
policy, it misses the mark in the instant case. The dissent’s fears are valid,
but the law is clear.
C.

Why the Majority Got It Right for the Wrong Reasons and
the Dissent Got It Wrong for the Right Reasons

In the instant case, Nosal exceeded authorized access to a
computer by using and distributing passwords beyond his own
eligibility.73 The majority, seeing the fear that millions of consensual
password sharers would have, tried to brush aside password sharing and
hastily swept the issue aside.74 But, whether the majority wants to admit it
or not, the instant case revolves around the fact that passwords were
71

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDEs § 2.1 (AM. L. INST. 2016).
Kerr, supra note 13, at 1151-52 (calling this phenomenon an implied license).
73
Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1029.
74
See generally id.
72
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shared which led to unauthorized access to a computer.75 The password
sharing alone was not enough to create criminal liability. The subsequent
use of those passwords created criminal liability. Thus, Nosal did violate
the CFAA. The majority needs to clarify that password sharing, followed
by the use of the shared password, is a criminal act in the Ninth Circuit.
The majority was quick to dismiss a multitude of amicus briefs, 76 but the
court followed the law to its logical conclusion: password sharing can be
criminal if the sharer exceeded authorized access.77
The majority made the right decision because password sharing is
one method of obtaining unauthorized access to a computer. An individual
or companies gains information from a computer that they could not have
otherwise had through exceeding authorized access or, similarly, through
means that were not authorized at all. Nosal did access a computer without
authorization, or his authorization had effectively expired, and stole
information to the computer owner’s detriment.78 Had the majority
stopped here, they probably could have won over the dissent. The majority

75

Id. at 1029.
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1029.
76

232
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

17

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 9

opened the door for new litigation because they stated, “Nosal is charged
with unauthorized access—getting into the computer after categorically
being barred from entry.”79 However, everyone who does not buy a
membership to a website is categorically barred from entry.80 If they
obtain the benefits of membership to the website, they have exceeded
authorized access. The court found that Nosal had unauthorized access and
proceeded to share that access.81 Nosal committed a crime on two fronts,
under the law.
Yet, even though the dissenting judge comes to the wrong
outcome, he does so for a very good reason. The judge is reasonable to
fear the criminalization of millions of harmless and ubiquitous acts.82
However, this concern is not critical to the issue at hand. Nosal stole trade
secrets from a company.83 This type of behavior is exactly what CFAA
was trying to protect against.84 When a person checks their personal email
at work, which may technically exceed the granted authorization from a

79

Id. at 1034.
NETFLIX TERMS OF USE (2016) ( “[T]he Account Owner should not reveal the
password to anyone”).
81
Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1036.
82
Id. at 1048-49 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
83
Id. at 1029.
84
Id. at 1032.
80
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computer’s owner, they are not accessing information specific to the
owner.
By looking back at the 1984 legislation, this is a simple logical link
as the Internet was in its infant stage. In 1984, computers had files on them
that needed to be protected. Today, those files could exist in cyberspace or
the cloud. The 1984 Congress, if reexamining the issue today, should have
no trouble distinguishing stealing trade secrets from harmlessly checking
email. But, even if this logic is unconvincing, the text of CFAA provides
the mens rea terms “knowingly and with intent to defraud.”85 A person
cannot both ubiquitously share their password yet possess the intent to
defraud.86 The courts could not reasonably interpret the statute as
criminalizing an act that countless people engage in.
The mens rea standard in CFAA makes criminalizing password
sharing a bit easier to swallow. When a person checks his or her personal
email on a work computer, and a company policy forbids it, they do not
intend to defraud the company because their behavior is seemingly
85

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
Fraud, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A knowing misrepresentation or
knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her
detriment. • Fraud is usu[ally] a tort, but in some cases [esp[ecially] when the conduct is
willful] it may be a crime”).
86
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harmless. Two people, using a single account, do not cause a great deal of
harm to a company like Netflix. By contrast, if a person intentionally puts
a worm or a virus onto a computer, it can be said that they are defrauding
the company by abusing their authorized access.
Further, many of the dissent’s concerns could be quelled if sharing
a password to a website is probably not covered by CFAA. As previously
mentioned, CFAA is explicit in its use of the word computer, 87 which is
now antiquated. The dissent is quick to note that point.88
“A protected computer is defined as a computer affected by or
involved in interstate commerce—effectively all computers with Internet
access . . . nearly all desktops, laptops, servers, smart-phones, as well as
any iPad, Kindle, Nook, X-box, [and] Blu-Ray player.”89 What a computer
means will be addressed in section V. However, it is important to note that
CFAA does have its limits. By explicitly stating computer, CFAA might
not include servers or other massive data storage systems on its face.

87

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024 at 1050.
89
Id. (internal citations omitted).
88
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Specifically, CFAA does not pertain to the cloud90 on its face. It would
seem that password sharing on Netflix91 is probably not covered by
CFAA; however, the framework exists for criminal liability.
VI. REDEFINING AND CHANGING ESSENTIAL TERMS IN CFAA
The courts cannot get around the fact that the law says
“computers.”92 A narrow interpretation of computer would suggest that
this means a physical, technological device, the primary function of which
is to keep and store digital data. A broader view could make the argument
for other devices to count as computers. Tablets could certainly qualify as
a computer because of their computational power as well as functionality.
However, courts cannot evade the fact that a computer is a physical
device. Thus, a website is not a computer. An issue arises below the
surface. Although websites are not themselves computers, they are backed
by computers on the ground. Because of the nature of the cloud, an

90

The Cloud is a series of interconnected servers that hold digital data which can be
accessed wirelessly. Jess Fee, The Beginner’s Guide to the Cloud, MASHABLE, (Aug. 26,
2013), http://mashable.com/2013/08/26/what-is-the-cloud/#lyMN6qjsvkqA.
91
Whose movies stream from the cloud.
92
Nosal, 844 F.3d at 1033-34.
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interconnected system of computers, once information is accessed on a
website, access to its storage system is also gained.93
Thus, a website can be so closely tied to database, that they can be
seen as one and the same. If access to information is like entering a
house,94 the website is the front door. A website allows the individual to
access stored information too great for the website alone to handle. Thus,
websites necessarily link back to other computers that actually store the
data.
Additionally, the cloud makes it fairly easy to view websites as
databases. Dropbox,95 Spotify,96 and Netflix97 are all databases. Dropbox
holds digital data. Spotify is a database for music. Netflix is a database for
movies. Thus, the distinction between computer systems and databases
may seem unimportant when regulating rudimentary access to websites,
but can be the difference between criminality and contract liability in
93

Jess Fee, The Beginner’s Guide to the Cloud, MASHABLE (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://mashable.com/2013/08/26/what-is-the-cloud/#lyMN6qjsvkqA.
94
Kerr, supra note 13, at 1148.
95
What’s Dropbox?, DROPBOX, https://www.dropbox.com/tour/1 (last visited June 19,
2017).
96
John Pullen, Everything You Need to Know About Spotify, TIME (June 3, 2015),
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password sharing for websites. Contract liability will be discussed more
fully in the conclusion. For now, it is important to note that violating a
contract, by exceeding its terms, can lead to liability.
If the courts automatically interpret unauthorized access to a
website to mean unauthorized access to a database, there are serious
ramifications for Netflix and its users. A website alone is not a database,
but it is connected to one. Thus, in order to gain “anything of value,” 98 the
final element of the CFAA necessitates access to a database, thus
computers. Tricking a website into giving access to a database would
create liability under CFAA. Before any cases can move forward,
Congress should seriously consider the definition of a computer, what
unauthorized access means, and what “anything of value” means.
Redefining computer so that it best fits for the modern age is
important, but not essential for violations under the CFAA. As it sits, the
CFAA could easily be construed to mean that every time a person accesses
a website to view a file, listen to music, or watch a movie without
authorization, they have committed a federal crime no matter what the
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medium. Hackers can target cell phones, Xboxes, and even thermostats.99
Accessing a video game system and accessing a corporate computer
should not be treated as equals under criminal law. Accessing a video
game in order to play it for free carries a minimal impact when compared
to accessing a corporation’s secret files. By outlining the parameters of a
computer, exactly what kind of unauthorized access is worthy of criminal
liability will become clear.
The best approach would be abandoning CFAA because its
original intent has been lost. Instead of hacking, any kind of intended
unauthorized access to a database exposes criminal liability. In 1984, the
only way to hack digital information was through a physical computer,
and all computers were fundamentally similar.100 Obviously, the damage
that a hacker can do to a digital thermostat is different than the damage
they can do by hacking a corporate computer. On the one hand, the hacker
can gain sensitive information about individuals and corporate secrets,
while on the other, he or she can ruin an electric bill. Further, access to a

99

Id.
By comparison to a cellphone, a video game console, a laptop, and a thermostat in
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website101 can lead to unauthorized access to movies or music, which have
a relatively small devastating effect on society. It would be prudent for
Congress to give a clearer meaning to, or change, the phrase “anything of
value” as it is used in CFAA. Redefining “anything of value” would help
ease the dissent’s concerns in Nosal because Congress could be explicit in
prohibiting the societally harmful behaviors associated with hacking.
Netflix has made “anything of value” more tangible under the CFAA. In
November 2016, Netflix announced that it would allow members to
download movies.102 Being able to download movies will make a more
tangible economic harm to tie liability to.
The unauthorized access issue is still a problem, but changing what
a computer means as well as rephrasing “anything of value” would help
future courts understand the bounds of unauthorized access. Congress
could simply clarify that unauthorized access” means access that either
exceeds express or implied authorization to satisfy the concerns of normal
password sharing the dissent focused on.
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VII. FUTURE PROBLEMS WITH PASSWORD SHARING
There still may be one issue in CFAA that will prevent liability.
CFAA includes a mens rea element. Neither the majority nor the dissent in
Nosal brought up the mens rea issue. As Orin Kerr correctly observed,
“computer trespass statutes generally require that the user commit an
intentional or knowing unauthorized access.”103 Criminal liability under
CFAA requires a hacker “intentionally access a computer without
authorization” or intentionally “exceeding authorized access.”104 As it is
the government’s job to prove mens rea, this is a serious limitation to
actual convictions.
The mens rea requirement, with respect to lack of authorization,
could mean the intent to access the computer or the intent to access the
information creates criminal liability. This difference is important, but still
remains an unanswered question through Nosal. If the element of
exceeding authorized access is met simply at the moment the computer
was logged into, then the first element is automatic. It is impossible to
gain information from a computer without accessing it. If the second
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interpretation is true, that the element is met when the hacker obtains the
data, the flow of logic is more clear. The elements could be sorted as
follows: (1) an unauthorized person; (2) intentionally; (3) gains access to
anything of value; (4) on a targeted computer.
By organizing the elements in this way, courts have a clearer
understanding of what constitutes a crime under CFAA. The Nosal
majority focused heavily on the fact that a computer was accessed without
authorization at the initial login.105 This is a problem because the element
is automatic, and the authors of the CFAA probably did not intend such an
interpretation because their focus was on hacking.106 The fact that a
computer was accessed is not the problem. The information accessed is the
problem. The fact that the information was on a computer should be an
additional step. This step is important when two actors are in play.
Password sharing is a unique issue because it requires two actors:
the person who accesses the information, and the sharer. Sharing your
password and logging on could easily be seen as trespassing on Netflix’s
website to provide you with content you should have otherwise paid for,
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Nosal v. U.S., 844 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1049.
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thus it has value. All other elements aside, the question of whether or not
the sharer of information could be criminally liable remains unanswered.
Under Nosal, there is strong evidence to suggest liability. It is clear that
the person who accesses this information is liable, but what about the
password sharer?
The Nosal majority’s focus was on the fact that Nosal himself
exceeded his authorized access to a computer.107 But if Nosal had not
accessed the computer personally, and had only given the information to
other people, the current holding may create criminal liability. If I were a
prosecutor, and Nosal had not personally accessed the information, I
would argue that Nosal is still liable under the theory that “exceeds
authorized access” means that Nosal simply had to go beyond the limits of
his authority in the process of accessing a computer’s valuable
information. Nosal’s agents accessed the information.108 He did that by
handing over passwords to other people, enabling their unauthorized
access, and exceeding his own authorized access.109 Nosal does not
personally have to gain the access to the computer itself under this theory,
107
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109
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just the data. As I noted above, the real crime cannot come at the moment
that the computer itself was breached, it has to come once the valuable
information was obtained. Thus, Nosal, a person who exceeded his
authority, and thus is unauthorized, intentionally gained access to
information that was contained on a computer.
Now, the dissent’s concerns should be ringing out. If all password
sharing is criminalized, then millions of people who share their passwords
are criminally liable.110 At face value, this is true. When a Netflix
password is shared to a person that does not live in the same household as
the member, he or she is a criminal under CFAA. The hacker has
knowingly taken unauthorized access to something of value, such as
movie rentals, from a computer, through Netflix’s website, and thus the
servers it runs on, which are computers. Further, as explained previously,
the sharer of the password is also criminally liable. So, sharing a password
to a website can trigger criminal liability under CFAA. Opponents to
Nosal’s interpretation of CFAA would most likely prefer that the act
clarify that the accessed computer was targeted. Thus, someone
specifically gained unauthorized access to a single computer that
110
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contained information of value because that targeted computer contained
something of value. But even with this change, “something of value” is so
vague that virtually any access to any one computer could be seen as
valuable, which millions of people do.
Societal norms must be taken into consideration when evaluating
criminal liability under CFAA. The dissent correctly notes that in the past,
the Ninth Circuit “emphatically refused to turn violations of use
restrictions imposed by employers or websites into crimes under the
CFAA, declining to put so many citizens at the mercy of [their] local
prosecutor.”111 It is inarguable that many people share passwords
regularly. The concerns an employer has in protecting its websites are
serious, and some acts can trigger criminal liability under CFAA.
However, not all unauthorized access should trigger should liability. The
dissent notes that these cases would cause the public to be at the mercy of
their prosecutor.112 Even the Huffington Post commented on Nosal’s effect
on sharing passwords.113 Ultimately, the article concluded that it would be

111
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unreasonable for Netflix or similar carriers to seek criminal action against
users who share their passwords.114 Punishment for such a crime would be
arbitrarily given.
The immediate decision does not take into consideration societal
norms. Although there are no estimates as to how many people actually
share their passwords and account information, an outbreak exists. The
dissent suggests that “millions”115 of people share passwords, which is a
safe estimate. Assuming that estimate is accurate, it seems implausible for
a company to not know that password sharing exists. In January 2016, the
CEO of Netflix went so far as to say he had no problem with password
sharing.116 When the CEO admits that he sees no problem, the password
sharing is normal because it happens so frequently. Netflix’s stock has
been soaring over the last five years. Shares of Netflix stock closed 2011
at $9.90.117 On October 28th, 2016, the stock opened just shy of $127.118 If
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password sharing is hurting Netflix, the stock price certainly does not
reflect the pain.
But even if password sharing is stunting Netflix’s growth, the act
should not be criminal for efficiency purposes. Password sharing should
be viewed in light of a contract dispute, not as criminal liability. This is
because a contract dispute resolves in putting the injured party in the
position they would be if the contract had been fully performed or had the
contract never been entered into.119 When a member of Netflix goes
beyond her license, she is in breach. Netflix can seek remedies that would
compensate for its economic loss. Contract law would increase efficiency
for Netflix in this case.
By contrast, criminal law seeks to punish wrongdoers, thus
decreasing utility for both parties. Netflix does not benefit from putting its
customers in jail. I can’t imagine that inmates are allowed their own
Netflix accounts. Netflix could lose customers and would create a public
relations nightmare. The company could not defend seeking criminal
charges against a high volume of customers. Unlike contract, criminal
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liability decreases efficiency across the board. From an efficient market
prospective, contract remedies make the most sense.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the facts in Nosal were substantially dissimilar to normal
password sharing, the Ninth Circuit will continue to be challenged by
cases that inch closer to normal password sharing. The majority was
correct in the instant case, but their correct decision rightfully creates
worry and shows a deeper problem in the congressional act. There could
be millions of criminals at large for engaging in a ubiquitous activity.
Further, contract law solves the problem more efficiently than criminal
law. Criminal liability turns on what a company authorizes to its members.
Thus, activity on one website (with a well crafted Terms of Service
Agreement) could create criminal liability, where another website (with a
poorly crafter Terms of Service Agreement) would not. There is no
universal standard for criminal liability. As the elements sit from the Nosal
decision, it is hard to believe that password sharing escapes criminal
liability under CFAA at face value limited only by arbitrary distinctions
between Terms of Service Agreements.
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